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Introduction
Worldwide recession along with increasing unemployment has renewed interest in trainingprograms that help workers accumulate additional skills to obtain new jobs or retain current ones. The economic benefits of participating in such training programs are substantial in developing countries.
1 However, these programs can help attenuate unemployment only if the targeted individuals volunteer to participate in the program. If instead, they refrain from participating in these specialized avenues of skill building, then increasing the supply of training schools and programs as a policy achieves little towards the final goal of improving labor market outcomes and welfare. For a policy-maker then, there is a case not just for promoting labor market training programs, but also to target them better to reap maximum welfare gains through increased participation. To achieve this, it is crucial to identify the selection process that identifies the factors influencing participation into the program.
Our goal in this paper is to focus on the participation decision, i.e., to determine whether individuals who apply to a training program, and those who do not, differ systematically along measured behavioral traits and socio-economic characteristics. 2 Identifying these traits can help us design and promote skill building programs more effectively in the future.
Self-selection has been previously studied in different contexts such as entrepreneurship (Cramer et al. (2002) in Netherlands; Bauernschuster et al. (2010) in Germany), participation into a labor market training program in the US (Heckman and Smith (2004) ), a school incentive program in India (Barnhardt et al. (2009) ), a microfinance, soft skills and entrepreneurship program in Uganda (Bandiera et al. (2012) ), and a migration program for Tongans (McKenzie et al. (2010) ). However, all these papers have relied only on the use of survey data to estimate 3 the participation or selection equation, leaving out possible sources of differences arising due to variation in behavioral characteristics between participants and non-participants. We aim to fill this crucial gap by examining the differences between applicants and non-applicants in a labormarket training program in terms of both behavioral traits and socio-economic characteristics.
We do this by combining data from a unique artefactual field experiment and responses from primary surveys.
3
The training program we examine was widely advertised to women between the ages of 18 and 39 years, having 5 or more grades of schooling, and residing in selected resettlement colonies (or slums) in New Delhi, India. Participants in our experiment consisted of a randomly selected pool of applicants (who applied to the training program), and non-applicants (those who chose not to apply in spite of receiving the advertisement). The artefactual field experiment was designed to elicit unobservable behavioral characteristics such as risk attitudes, confidence level, and attitudes towards competition. We also administered a detailed household survey, which allowed us to examine household characteristics that can further influence the selfselection.
Our results show that the probability of applying to the training program can vary in terms of both socio-economic and behavioral characteristics. We find that younger women, with prior experience in stitching and tailoring, not belonging to the backward caste (a description used by the Government of India to identify socially and economically disadvantaged groups), belonging to relatively richer households, and those with a higher dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of number of children aged less than 5 to the number of adult women in the household), have a significantly higher probability of applying to the training program. Further, the results from our artefactual field experiment reveal that women with greater preference for 4 risk and competition are significantly more likely to apply to the training program. In contrast to what has been done previously in the literature, this suggests that focusing only on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics might not be sufficient to fully explain selection into the program. Participants' behavioral traits are important determinants of self-selection into labor market training programs and can influence take up rates in such programs.
While individuals can vary along many behavioral dimensions, we chose to investigate three important dimensions that can critically influence the choice of selecting/applying into the program. The first source is risk preference. It is well documented that risk attitudes affect important life choices including occupational choices (Castillo et al. (2010) ), investment in higher education (Belzil and Leonardi (2009), Chen (2003) ), and technology adoption (Liu (2008) ) Additionally, in developing countries incomplete financial markets fail to smooth economic risks, and institutional hurdles make any investment fraught with uncertainty. As a result, only individuals with a higher tolerance for risk might be willing to engage in any investment activity. Joining a skill accumulation program is an investment activity that involves considerable time and monetary costs with often delayed and uncertain benefits. Consequently, one would expect that, risk attitudes might play a role in the decision to participate in the training program.
Second, we examine whether competitiveness influences the participation decision into the training program. Previous literature suggests that differences in competitiveness influence wage differences, educational choices, workplace choices, and influence the evolution of gender differences (Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) , Gneezy et al. (2009 ), Andersen et al. (2010 , Flory et al. (2010) , Buser et al. (2012) ). This leads us to hypothesize that differences in competitiveness possibly impact the decision to apply for an income enhancing training program as well.
Third, confidence is claimed to have a significant impact on labor market outcomes (Koszegi (2006) , Bénabou and Tirole (2002) ), although credible empirical evidence on the effect of confidence on labor market outcomes is rare due to the difficulty in measuring and 5 obtaining data on confidence. It has been pointed out that the level of confidence can affect wage rates (Fang and Moscarini (2005) ), performance in financial markets (Biais et al. (2005)) entrepreneurial behavior (Cooper et al. (1988) , Camerer and Lovallo (1999) , Bernardo and Welch (2001) , Koellinger et al. (2007) ), and can explain the persistence of intergenerational inequality in income and education (Filippin and Paccagnella (2009) ).
The three behavioral traits we have identified are obviously important for those interested in entrepreneurship and self-employment opportunities. These traits however, are also relevant for those interested in seeking wage employment. Job-seekers are typically exposed to risk related to the probability of finding a job, and face the uncertainty of receiving higher future wages when employed (see Bonin et al. (2007) and Pfeifer (2011) for a discussion on the impact of risk preferences on wages in salaried employment). More confident and more competitive individuals might be more successful in obtaining jobs and receiving success (promotion/wage increases) in these jobs. So it is important to examine and understand how these specific traits influence selection into training programs that can improve labor market outcomes (both wage and self employment).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a description of the training program, the subject pool, and the experimental design. Descriptive statistics and regression results are presented in Section 3. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4.
Methodology

Background: The Training Program
The data used in this paper were collected as a part of a baseline survey and an artefactual field experiment administered to a pool of applicants and non-applicants of a subsidized training program in stitching and tailoring services. This program was implemented jointly by two non- The stitching and tailoring program required a time commitment of 10 hours a week and taught participants to stitch clothes for women, men, and children. In June 2010 all program related information was widely advertised to every household in the disadvantaged areas (slums/resettlement colonies) of South and North Shahdara in New Delhi, India. The advertisement did not focus on any specific sub-group in the population, and was distributed to every household in the target area to ensure maximum outreach for the program. As a result, all women (eligible and ineligible, residing in the same household) received the information about the training program. Further, the description of the scope of the training program was kept general enough to encourage all eligible women to apply, and avoid attracting women with any specific characteristics that could have biased our results. 5 The English version of the advertisement pamphlet is presented in Figure 1 (originally in Hindi). The eligibility criteria in the pamphlet specified women had to be between the ages of 18 and 39, with at least five or more completed grades of schooling and living in the targeted area. SATYA and Pratham employees held joint information sessions, where interested women had the opportunity to meet with representatives from the two NGOs to discuss and clarify questions about the program.
The sessions, along with the advertisement pamphlets specified that training would be provided by well-qualified and reputable staff, using modern techniques of stitching and tailoring; new sewing machines and other related resources would also be provided on site. The participants were further told that they would receive a certificate at the end of the program. Application forms were made available for distribution at these information sessions and all women were asked to take the application forms back home, discuss this opportunity with their family, and 7 then return the completed forms back to the NGOs within the deadline.
The Subject Pool for the Artefactual Field Experiment
While the training program was open to all eligible women residing in both the South and North Shahdara regions of New Delhi, the artefactual field experiment was conducted only in South Shahdara because of operational considerations (field specific and funding constraints). A total of 222 women residing in South Shahdara (153 of whom were applicants and 69 were nonapplicants) participated in the artefactual field experiment, which was conducted in July 2010.
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At that time no one knew of the eventual treatment status of the applicants to the training program since the lottery had not been conducted, thereby ruling out the possibility of the treatment status influencing the decision to participate in the artefactual experiment. In addition, at the time of recruitment for the artefactual field experiment, all potential participants (particularly the applicants) were informed that outcomes in the artefactual field experiment would have no bearing on their selection into the training program.
Sampling
Since only a small proportion (5.5 percent) of the eligible women applied to the program, inviting a random sample of eligible women from the population to the artefactual field experiment might have resulted in a subject pool with inadequate number of applicants. We used a choice based sampling strategy and oversampled the applicants to rule out that possibility. As a result of oversampling the applicants, the parameter estimates from a standard probit regression (for applicant status) give us coefficients that represent the sample but not the population and may therefore be biased. To correct for this, we adopt a Weighted Endogenous Maximum Likelihood estimation strategy. This is discussed in sections 2.3 and 3.2.
Due to time and funding constraints we first decided on the maximum number of 6 67% of the final sample of applicants who participated in the artefactual field experiment were ultimately randomly assigned to the treatment group and the remaining to the control group. Since the information about their treatment status was not known to any of the stake holders (the applicants, the researchers, and the NGOs) at the time of the artefactual field experiment and the survey, the regression results presented in Tables 3 and 4 do not take into account the ultimate treatment status. 8 invitations (300) for the 12 experimental sessions. Next, we used the addresses of the applicants and randomly drew 200 women, who were then invited to participate in the artefactual field experiment. For the non-applicants, we followed a similar strategy and randomly invited 100 women who satisfied the eligibility criterion (5 or more grades of schooling, between the ages of 18 and 39 years, and residing in South Shahdara). 153 applicants out of the 200 invited, and 69 non-applicants out of the 100 invited showed up to participate in the artefactual field experiment. 7 A more detailed discussion of this issue is presented in section 2.3.
Subjects who participated in the artefactual field experiment were also requested to complete a household survey that collected detailed information on household demographic characteristics, schooling outcomes, assets, employment, and quality of life. Due to the length of the household survey, it was not possible to administer the survey during the experiment. The survey was therefore conducted at the participants' homes at a later date but before the women knew their treatment status. We were unable to collect survey data from 18 (7 applicants and 11 non-applicants) of the 222 women who participated in the experiment -either they could not be traced or they did not want to participate in the survey. Selection-related concerns arising from non-response in the household survey are further discussed in section 2.3.
Our final sample for which we have both data from the artefactual field experiment and the household survey consists of 204 women -146 applicants to the training program and 58 non-applicants. See Table 1 for a complete distribution of applicants and non-applicants at different stages. We conducted 12 sessions with 16 -20 subjects in each session. Each session lasted approximately 2 hours and each subject participated in only one session. The average payment received from participation was Rs. 203. 8 7 The difference between the two groups of participants (76.5% of the invited applicants and 69% of the invited non-applicants participated) is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.16 using a two-sided t-test). 8 The official minimum wages for unskilled workers in Delhi was Rs 203 per day at the time of running these experiments (in 2010). However, the minimum wage legislations are rarely imposed in India, and most women in our sample would be receiving less than this stipulated amount. Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) in their survey of field experiments in developing countries argue that paying on average one to two days wage for a half-day session creates the necessary salience for participants in the field (page
Recruitment process
Two weeks after the deadline for applying to the program, 200 women from the pool of all eligible applicants and 100 women from the pool of eligible non-applicants to the vocational training program were randomly selected and invited to participate in one randomly chosen session of the artefactual field experiment. Consequently, the group composition was randomly determined. Although we did not collect data on how many other group members each participant knew, given the high density of population in South Shahdara it is unlikely that participants knew many of the other participants in the session they participated in. As explained earlier, it was also stressed during the time of the recruitment that participation in the artefactual experiment will have no influence on the placement into the treatment group of the training program.
Exploring Sample Bias
The research question we aim to address, and the sampling techniques we use, can lead to three potential sources of sample selection: 1) Not all women who were invited to participate in the experiment actually showed up to participate. 2) Some women who participated in the experiment did not participate in the household survey.
3) The proportion of applicants and non-331). For a two-hour session that we conducted, a day's worth of wages satisfies this criterion. The exchange rate at the time of running these experiments was $1 (US) = Rs 46.
applicants in our final sample is different from the population proportions. We rule out all three of these sample selection concerns below.
First, to rule out bias arising from non-response/selection into the artefactual field experiment, we show that (i) women who were invited and participated in the experiment are no different to the women who were invited and did not participate in the artefactual field experiment; and (ii) that applicants and non-applicants who participated in the experiment are representative of the applicant and non-applicant population in South Shahdara. To address point (i) we compare age and completed grades of schooling of women who were invited and showed-up with that of women who were invited but did not show-up, separately for the applicants and non-applicants. We are able to make these comparisons using information on two demographic characteristics -age and completed grades of schooling -that were collected as part of the pre-baseline census of eligibility in the region. These comparisons are reported in Panel A, Table A1 in Appendix 1, columns 3 and 6. We find no significant difference in age and completed grades of schooling between subjects who were invited and showed up, and subjects who were invited but did not show-up in the two groups: applicants and non-applicants. To address point (ii) we compare the average age and completed grades of schooling of all applicants and non-applicants in the census who did not participate in the artefactual field experiment with that of the applicants and non-applicants who participated in the artefactual field experiment. The results presented in columns 3 and 6, Panel B of Table A1 shows that both the applicant and the non-applicant sample is representative of the respective population along these two demographic characteristics.
Second, we need to ensure that non-response in the survey (after participating in the experiment) is not systematically related to observed behavioral characteristics, leading to a potential bias in our results. To do this, we compare the behavioral characteristics of subjects who participated in the artefactual field experiment and completed the survey, with subjects who only participated in the artefactual field experiment but did not complete the survey (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). This Table shows that there are no significant differences between 11 these two groups of participants. We also estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable (non-response) is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if household survey data is missing and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables in this regression include the set of behavioral traits included in specification 3 in Table 3 (see below) and the interaction of these variables with applicant status. The results are presented in Table A3 in Appendix 1. None of the variables included in the set of explanatory variables (interacted or not) are statistically significant and the interaction terms are also not jointly statistically significant. This implies that non-response is not systematically related to behavioral differences between applicants and non-applicants.
Additionally, we compare the age and completed grades of schooling available for the two groups (available from the pre-baseline census) and do not find a significant difference in these two characteristics between survey responders and non-responders in the applicant and nonapplicant groups (see columns 3 and 6, Panel C, Table A1 ). Finally, the results presented in section 3 could have been biased because of the fact that the sample proportion of the applicants and non-applications were not representative of the population proportions. Any concern that the sample is skewed in favor of the applicants and does not represent the true population is addressed by using the weighted endogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML) estimation technique proposed by Manski and Lerman (1977) .
See Section 3.2 for more details.
In summary, our analysis allows us to rule out any systematic bias in the sample and concludes that our subject pool is representative of the population. 10 12
Design
Each subject participated in two games (the games are similar to those reported in Gneezy et al. (2009) ). The first game was designed to evaluate subjects' attitudes towards risk (investment game). Each subject was endowed with Rs 50 and had the option of allocating any portion of her endowment to a risky asset that had a 50% chance of quadrupling the amount invested. The invested amount could also be lost with a 50% probability. The subject retained any amount that she chose not to invest. If the investment game was chosen for payment purposes, each subject tossed a coin that determined whether her investment succeeded or not.
The second game was designed to investigate the inherent competitiveness of subjects (competition game). Each subject participated in a real-effort task, which consisted of filling up 1.5 fl oz. zip lock bags in a minute with kidney beans (locally known as rajma). Prior to the task a subject had to privately choose one of two methods of compensation. She could choose a piece-rate compensation method, which depended solely on her own performance, and she would receive Rs 4 for each correctly filled bag. Alternatively, she could choose a competitionrate compensation method where her earnings would depend on how she performed relative to another randomly chosen subject in the same session. A subject received Rs 16 per bag if she filled equal number of bags or more bags than her matched opponent. If she filled fewer bags than her opponent, she received nothing. If the competition game was chosen for payment purposes and if the participant had chosen the competition rate payment method, she was matched with one other person in the session for payment. The matching was done as follows.
approach could potentially help participants further disassociate the decisions in the experiment with selection into the program, it could create other critical problems. Specifically we would have then faced considerable sampling issues because at the time of the artefactual field experiment we would not know whether a particular participant would ultimately apply to the program or not. Since only a very small proportion of the eligible women actually applied to the program, inviting a random sample of eligible women from the population (N = 4417) to the artefactual field experiment might not have provided us with a subject pool with adequate number of applicants. This would potentially make this current study less robust and perhaps not even feasible and also lead to an ineffective evaluation of the training program conducted. We do note however that this is an interesting idea and a future research project could explore whether in such an environment, the timing of the artefactual field experiment would matter.
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The subject drew a chit from a box containing the IDs of the other participants in the session.
Her performance was matched to that of the person whose ID was drawn. The matched participant's payoff remained unaffected. The participants were informed of this process beforehand and assured that all parts of the decision-making will be in private.
Our design in this game was similar to Gneezy et al. (2009) and Cameron et al. (2013) and was necessitated due to cognitive characteristics of our subjects and time constraints in our field environment. Since the participants did not compete against a fixed past performance of others as in the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) study, there was a possibility that the session composition could affect the decision to compete. However, as explained above, the composition of all sessions was randomly determined. Session composition and the expectations of subjects about who would compete should be therefore on an average similar across sessions.
11
When choosing their compensation method, the subjects were asked to guess their own performance in the game. More specifically, each subject was asked to provide an estimate of the number of bags she expected to fill in the real-effort task, and also her own performancebased relative rank. We use participant's guesses about her performance in the real effort task to construct three different measures of confidence: (a) an absolute measure of confidence (the subject's estimate about the number of bags she would be able to fill in one minute); (b) a relative measure of confidence (the subject's estimate about her relative standing (rank) vis-à- 11 We conducted several additional statistical tests to explore if there are systematic session level differences in the proportion of women choosing to compete. A chi-square test on equality of choices between sessions indicates no significant relationship between the type of compensation scheme chosen and the session (available on request from the authors) except in one specific session. We re-estimated the preferred specification reported in the paper excluding data from this particular session (thereby excluding 22 subjects), and obtain similar results. In addition, we decompose the variation in the choice of the competition-rate payment scheme in the competition game and find that 95% of the variation in the choice of the competition-rate payment scheme in the competition game comes from within session variation and only 5% of the variation in choices is explained by variation across sessions, i.e., substantial homogeneity in choices across sessions and substantial heterogeneity in choices within each session. We also ran a regression where the dependent variable is choice of competitive wage scheme in the competition game. We regress this variable on the set of session dummies. The overall test that the assignment to the session does not affect the choice of competitive wage scheme in the competition game cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.59).
vis other participants in the session); and (c) confidence ratio, (the ratio of the number of bags the subject expects to fill to the number of bags she actually fills).
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In each session, only one of the games was chosen for payment purposes. For the realeffort task in the experiment we wanted to avoid a task that was very familiar to a particular sub-section of our subjects as that could possibly bias their expectations about their performance in the game (See Gneezy et al. (2009) for a discussion). At the same time, we needed to choose a task that was feasible for our subject population, which ruled out many of the familiar experimental tasks such as computing sums, or word tasks since our participants (and indeed the population they are drawn from) are weak in these skills. Kidney beans comprise a staple diet in the region; women are used to handling the beans regularly -they take them out in bowls, clean and cook them, and all our participants are likely to be equally familiar with this particular task.
No communication was allowed during the session. The instructions were read out in Hindi. 13 We also displayed visual descriptions of the tasks while reading out the instructions, (see Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix 2). To enhance comprehension and minimize anchoringbias, the instructions contained examples different from the ones displayed in the charts. In addition, to ensure comprehension of the game, each subject was asked a few questions prior to making choices in each game. 14 While the same female experimenter read the instructions out aloud in every session, the questions were administered by two or three experimenters, depending on availability.
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Several of our subjects, despite having completed 5 or more grades of schooling, had poor reading and writing skills. 16 The experimenters were therefore required to be actively involved in administering the questions and noting down the responses. Such a protocol could reduce the social distance between the subject and the experimenter, and potentially create scrutiny effects. Our main interest lies in the differences in the responses of applicants and nonapplicants, and as long as any one of the groups is not systematically more affected by the scrutiny effect, any potential bias arising from the scrutiny effect will be differenced out. The fact that the decisions taken in the games were not hypothetical and influenced by non-trivial monetary amounts, reinforces the contention that subject choices can be viewed as real investment decisions, and are minimally affected by any lack of social distance. We think that our method is particularly relevant for field experiments run in developing countries where participating subjects might not have sufficient reading and writing skills.
The experimental protocol remained the same in every session: the experimenter read the general instructions aloud first; she then read out the instructions for the investment game; subjects made allocation decisions privately for the investment game; the experimenter read out the instructions for the competition game, and then administered questions about the choice of the compensation method and the confidence level of subjects in private. The real effort task was conducted last, and finally a coin was tossed to decide the game that would be used for payment. At the conclusion of the experiment each subject was called and paid their earnings in cash privately.
17 15 An analysis of responses indicates that there are no differences depending on the gender of the experimenter administering the questions. 16 Even with recent advances in overall educational attainment in India, as of 2005 half the children enrolled in grade five could not read (and write) grade two level text (see Pratham (2006) ). Levels of educational attainment were only worse when our participant pool attended school. 17 Note that in the competition game the subjects chose their preferred payment scheme after the instructions had been read out and after it was clearly demonstrated to them what we mean by a correctly
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The games were always run in the same order (i.e., the investment game, followed by the competition game), no feedback was provided to the subjects in between the two games and subjects were paid on the basis of the outcomes in one of the two tasks, randomly determined after all participants had finished participating in both games. The only task that a subject received any feedback for was the one for which she was paid. Due to our chosen experimental design we cannot explicitly test for order effects; however, paying for one game with no feedback between games, minimizes such a concern. Paying for one game also helps reduce wealth effects.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
We start our analysis by discussing sample descriptives. Panel A in Table 2 (2011)) and psychological studies (Weinstein (1980) ; Taylor and Brown (1988) ; Koellinger et al. (2007) ), which find that subjects are often irrationally overconfident about their own abilities.
In Table 2 we also present the averages (and standard deviations) for the sample of applicants and non-applicants and a test of significance of the difference between the two groups. Non-applicants are older, more likely to belong to a backward caste (OBC), less likely to have prior experience in stitching and tailoring, belong to poorer families, and are less happy at home (see column 4 in Panel A) as compared to applicants. Non-applicants also fill more bags in the allotted one-minute and are more impatient (see column 4 in Panel B).
Several other points are worth noting about our sample. First, women who choose the competition-rate compensation method are significantly more likely to place themselves at a higher rank within the group (correlation coefficient is 0.18 with a p-value = 0.007). This is not surprising, since in the competition-rate compensation method they will earn a positive amount only if they fill more bags than their competitor, it seems logical to observe that a woman is likely to choose this method of compensation only if she believes herself to be better than others in the group. The choice of the compensation method is however not affected by their expectation of the number of bags they are likely to fill in the allotted one minute (the measure of absolute confidence).
Second, while the average number of bags filled in one minute is significantly higher for women choosing the competition-rate compensation method (2.06 compared to 1.81, pvalue = 0.015, two-sided t-test), there is no difference in the between-subject variance in the number of bags filled in the allotted one minute depending on the compensation method chosen.
Therefore there is no evidence that sorting based on choice of the payment mechanism is efficiency increasing unlike in Eriksson et al. (2009) , where the mean of effort is higher and the variance lower with a competitive wage scheme.
Finally, while the two games we chose have some similar characteristics they measure distinct behavioral traits. In terms of similarities it can be argued that there is an element of risk in the competition game as well. Choosing the competition rate as opposed to the piece-rate payment scheme can potentially be a risky alternative since the payoff in this case depends on relative performance and not absolute performance. One could view this as a reflection of participants' attitude towards strategic risk. Competitive women would have invested more in the risky asset if strategic risk were to be positively correlated with exogenous risk, that is, the kind of risk the subject faces in the investment game. To examine this, we test for differences in the amount allocated to the risky asset in the investment game by type of wage scheme chosen in the competition game and find that on an average women chose to invest 50% of their endowment in the investment game and this does not differ by their decision (piece rate or competitive rate) in the competition game (difference in risk amount = 0.69 and p-value = 0.65, two-sided t-test). In terms of different features, the choice in the investment game is in response to an endowment, while the choice in the competition game is in response to earnings from a real effort task. Recent research suggests that individuals behave differently depending on whether the money is allocated to them or whether they earn it (see, for example, Cherry et al. (2002) , Dasgupta (2011 ), Erkal et al. (2011 ). Further, although the relative returns from choosing the riskier alternative were identical in the two games, the expected payoffs across games are different. While there is positive correlation between decisions in the investment game and the competition game, this is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.65). The lack of significant correlation between the two games therefore suggests that behavior is game specific in the experiment.
Regression Results
The sample is deliberately skewed in favor of the applicants and does not represent the true population. To address this bias, we follow the weighted endogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML) estimation technique proposed by Manski and Lerman (1977) . This estimation strategy requires that the true population proportions be known for both the applicants and the non-applicants. Fortunately, we have data on both the sample and the population proportion of applicants and non-applicants. Using these proportions, the WESML estimator applies weight = 0.077 for applicants and weight = 3.32 for non-applicants.
The weighted probit estimates reported in Table 3 capture the effect of the socioeconomic and behavioral variables on the decision to apply to the program. The marginal effects and robust standard errors are reported in Table 3 . Results corresponding to different specifications are presented in columns (1) -(3) in Table 3 . In column (1), we include only socio-economic characteristics obtained from the survey. In column (2) we include the proportion of endowment allocated to the risky option in the investment game, choice of the competitive wage scheme in the competition game, and actual performance in the real effort task (number of bags actually filled in the allotted one minute) as additional controls. In column (3) we also control for the confidence ratio. Hence this specification includes the full set of socio-economic characteristics and behavioral traits, and is our preferred specification.
Additional specifications to examine the robustness of our results are discussed in Section 3.3.
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The results from the full specification in column (3) of Table 3 show that applicants and non-applicants differ in terms of a number of socio-economic and demographic characteristics.
Younger women are more likely to apply to the program. An additional year in age is associated with a 0.3 percentage point reduction in the probability of applying to the program. Women belonging to backward castes are 2 percentage points less likely to apply for the program.
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Women with some prior experience in tailoring and stitching are almost 30-percentage points more likely to apply to the program.
Applicant status is affected by household income and dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of the number of children under 5 in a household and the number of adult females in the household). In our sample, a 10,000 Rupee increase in household income, net of the participant's own income, increases the probability of applying to the program by 3-percentage points. Applicants therefore were from relatively richer households (the targeted sample are all disadvantaged, so richer is only defined in a relative sense). Dependency ratio can influence choice in two different ways. First, since women are typically the primary care-givers for children, a woman belonging to a household that has relatively more children compared to the available adult women faces a substantially higher time-cost of participating in the training program. In this case an increase in the dependency ratio might result in a participant substituting away from the training program, and hence reduce the probability of applying to the program. On the other hand, it is often the case that in our subject-pool, it is the woman's responsibility to find the resources required to send children to school or take them to a doctor/hospital when they are sick. Most applicants report that the primary reason for applying to the program is to increase future income. An increase in dependency ratio would put more pressure on the adult woman to seek out additional ways to enhance household income. We would then expect a positive relation between the increase in the dependency ratio and the probability of applying to the program due to the underlying income-earning motive. Which of the two effects is stronger is an empirical question. In our sample, we find that the income earning effect dominates the substitution effect.
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Turning to the effects of the behavioral traits, we find that women who have a greater tolerance for risk, i.e., those who choose to invest more in the risky option in the investment game, and prefer a competitive wage scheme are more likely to apply to the vocational training program. A one-percent increase in the proportion of the endowment allocated to the risky option in the investment game is associated with a 6-percentage point increase in the probability of applying to the program (see column (3), Table 3 ). Women who choose the competitive wage scheme in the competition game are 3-percentage points more likely to apply to the program. A unit increase in the confidence ratio is associated with a 0.3-percentage point increase in the probability of applying to the program, though this effect is not statistically significant. The effects of risk tolerance and competitiveness persist even when we control for participants' confidence levels. These are large conditional effects, controlling for a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics. The behavioral variables are also always jointly significant in explaining applicant status.
Robustness
We estimate several alternative specifications to ensure that the findings presented in Table 3 are robust. We discuss these robustness tests in this section and Table 4 reports the corresponding results, as before, using the WESML estimation technique. First, in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 we include alternative measures of confidence: self-assessment of the number of bags they could fill in the real effort task (column (1)) and perceived rank within the group (column (2)). In these two specifications we do not include confidence ratio in the set of 20 We included membership in a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) as an additional explanatory variable in all our regressions. Anderson and Baland (2002) argue that membership in a ROSCA could be viewed as a measure of bargaining power of the woman. Additionally ROSCA participation could also indicate credit or savings constraints or the need to shield earnings from family members. Finally ROSCA participation can be interpreted as a measure of social capital as it is membership in a community organisation. However in none of the regressions, ROSCA membership has a statistically significant effect on the decision to apply to the program.
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explanatory variables. A unit increase in the number of bags the woman expects to be able to fill is associated with a 0.2 percentage points increase in the probability of applying for the program. Similarly a unit increase in the perceived rank within the group is associated with a 0.7 percentage point increase in the probability of applying for the program. Though in neither case is the effect statistically significant. The rest of the results remain qualitatively similar.
Second, in column (3) we include an indicator of impatience as an additional control (the rest of the explanatory variables are as in column (3) in Table 3 ). The rate at which an individual discounts future pay-offs can influence the decision to be an applicant to the program. Returns from a training program (and indeed from all educational programs) require a gestation lag to bear fruit (see for example Mullainathan (2005) for a discussion on how time preference can shape schooling decisions). It is possible that women who have a higher discount rate for future utility might tend to discount the future returns from the program more heavily (i.e., are more impatient) and choose not to apply. To understand patterns of time preference we included a hypothetical question in our household survey where the respondent is asked to choose between a sure prize of Rs 100 today versus Rs 150 one month from today. The variable impatience takes the value of 1 if the respondent chooses Rs 100 today. The results from specification 3 in Table 4 show that consistent with Table 1 , the coefficient of the impatience dummy is in the expected direction though it is not statistically significant. The inclusion of this variable does not have any effect on the other explanatory variables (compare column (3) in Tables 3 and 4) .
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In addition to the specifications reported in Table 4 , we conducted a number of other sensitivity checks, which are not reported here given space constraints. First, we investigated whether the effects of the behavioral characteristics are different in economically better-off 21 There are different ways of capturing this impatience. Our measure of impatience is based on hypothetical choices as it was difficult to operationalize the later payments in the field. This hypothetical feature could be the cause of the less significant results for this variable in the regression. Measuring impatience using monetary incentives (see for example Harrison et al. (2002) ) would be useful in future research.
households? To examine this we constructed a dummy variable (rich households), which takes the value 1 if the household income is greater than the mean household income for the sample and 0 otherwise. We interacted the three behavioral characteristics with this rich household dummy and included these interaction terms as additional controls. The difference estimate (given by the coefficient estimate of the interaction term) is never statistically significant, indicating that the behavioral characteristics do not have a differential impact on the likelihood of applying to the program across different income levels. Second, the coefficient estimate on risk is robust to the inclusion of variables that capture household wealth, measured by house ownership. We re-estimate our preferred specification in Table 3 including a dummy for house ownership, and find that our results continue to hold. Third, our key results are robust to the inclusion of participant's own income as an additional covariate in the main regression. Finally we explored locational cluster effects. Women in the sample reside in 12 different areas (within South Shahdara). To account for common area level unobservables we include area dummies with robust standard errors. We find that the magnitude and signs of all the coefficient estimates are very similar to those obtained from the estimates reported in column (3) in Table 3 . These results are available on request.
Discussion
This paper uses a novel design that combines household survey data with unique experimental data to shed light on the determinants of self-selection into vocational training programs.
Identifying the mechanisms underlying self-selection into training programs can be important for multiple reasons. First, it can enable us to determine which observable characteristics, individual or at the household-level, matter in encouraging the targeted population to apply for training programs. Identification of these determinants can help policy makers decide on the possible role of subsidies and transfers to promote participation (see Heckman (1992) ), since low participation can potentially weaken the overall benefits of such programs. Second, very little is known about the individual-level behavioral characteristics such as differences in 24 preferences, inherent competitiveness, and other abilities that can potentially influence selfselection into programs. For example, individuals who choose to apply to training programs might be more competitive and confident than the average non-applicant, and ignoring such behavioral characteristics can result in biased program effects.
Using our approach to identify behavioral characteristics along with the demographic and socio-economic characteristics, we find that women who have a greater preference for risk and are more competitive have a higher propensity to apply for the specific training program.
The results from our surveys reveal in addition that younger women with prior experience in stitching and tailoring and belonging to households with higher income and dependency ratio, have a significantly higher probability of applying to the stitching and tailoring training program.
Although our analysis focuses on identifying factors that affect self-selection into a specific program for a specific population, we believe that this population is of considerable interest and insights gained from this population can be applied elsewhere. First, the young population in our sample is reflective of the population structure in the majority of developing countries. Second, more than a third of the urban population in developing countries reside in slums and improving the condition of these slum dwellers by providing them marketable skills is of crucial importance to governments and policy makers. Third, in developing countries around the world, women typically have low rates of skill accumulation, and labor force participation. Increasing skills and labor force participation rates of women therefore, can have significant effects on aggregate productivity in these countries (See UNESCO (2012) and Census (2011) for more on these issues). The first step however is to get women to apply to such programs. Lessons from this study are therefore applicable to many other countries facing similar challenges involving demographics, growth, skill accumulation, and development.
The behavioral characteristics we chose to study can influence self-selection decisions of a broader target population into many other skill building programs meant for improving wage and self-employment opportunities. In future, research insights from this project can be used to explore additional programs and how differences in measured behavioral traits can potentially explain the heterogeneous policy outcomes often observed in the field: for example, why a program succeeds in certain neighborhoods and not in others, even after controlling for a range of observable characteristics.
The inclusion and better measurement of these behavioral traits can inform policy makers how to devise and advertise new policies aimed at improving participation rates. For example, for an observed level of risk attitudes, a policy can be promoted such that the risk associated with its returns are better articulated, thereby influencing the probability weights used by individuals to calculate their expected payoffs. It is important to note here that there might be other behavioral traits as well, that can differ between applicants and non-applicants.
Examining them are beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. However, using our approach one can envision policy-makers designing perfectly targeted individualspecific programs where a large set of identified behavioral determinants and their effects are incorporated in the implementation stages of the programs. Although identifying and uncovering behavioural traits using incentivised methods would require resources, they might not be that substantial since these traits could be elicited as part of household surveys (as in Bartling et al. (2009) ). Further, identifying the specific sources of behavioral traits can help researchers address the selection issue better by specifically controlling for these characteristics instead of including them in the black box called unobservables. Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Completed secondary school is a dummy for women with at least 10 grades of schooling. OBC is a dummy for Other Backward Castes (a classification used by the government of India to classify economically and socially disadvantaged groups). The reference caste categories are households that belong to scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or general caste. Dependency ratio is defined as the number of children in the household under 5 divided by the number of adult females in the household. Happy at home is a dummy that takes a value 1 if the respondent is very satisfied or moderately satisfied at home, 0 otherwise. Confidence ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of bags the subject expects to fill to the number of bags she actually fills. Perceived rank = 1 if lowest, = 5 if highest. Variables included in this Notes: Standard deviation reported in parentheses and standard errors reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. None of the differences reported in column 3 are statistically significant. 
Instructions for Final Payment Determination
We will now determine what task to pay you for. We will flip a coin; you will all be paid for task 1 if Heads come and task 2 if Tails come up. If Head comes up, then Task 1 is chosen: Each one of you will flip a coin to determine whether your investment succeeded or not. If the coin comes up heads, you win four times the amount you chose to invest. If it comes up tails, you lose the amount invested. If Tail comes up then Task 2 is chosen: We will pay you according to the choice you had indicated earlier.
If you had chosen option 1, we will pay you according to your performance. If you had chosen option 2, we will ask you to pick one chit amongst several chits of paper on the front desk. Each chit contains an id number of one of the participants. Your performance will be matched with the performance of the participant whose ID number you picked. You will be paid according to your relative performance as described earlier. Now we will call each of you one at a time like before. Please take your decision sheets with your ID# written on it when you come. 
